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Abstract—Botnets compose a major source of malicious activity
over a network and their early identification and detection is
considered as a top priority by security experts. The majority of
botmasters rely heavily on a scan procedure in order to detect
vulnerable hosts and establish their botnets via a command and
control (C&C) server. In this paper we examine the statistical
characteristics of the scan process invoked by the Mariposa and
Zeus botnets and demonstrate the applicability of conditional
entropy as a robust metric for profiling it using real pre-captured
operational data. Our analysis conducted on real datasets demon-
strates that the distributional behaviour of conditional entropy
for Mariposa and Zeus-related scan flows differs significantly
from flows manifested by the commonly used NMAP scans. In
contrast with the typically used by attackers Stealth and Connect
NMAP scans, we show that consecutive scanning flows initiated
by the C&C servers of the examined botnets exhibit a high
dependency between themselves in regards of their conditional
entropy. Thus, we argue that the observation of such scan flows
under our proposed scheme can sufficiently aid network security
experts towards the adequate profiling and early identification
of botnet activity.
Index Terms—Botnets, Mariposa, Zeus, NMAP Stealth, NMAP
Connect, Scan Traffic, Conditional Entropy
I. INTRODUCTION
The term botnet relates to a network of compromised
machines (i.e. bots) that without their knowledge are controlled
remotely by a botmaster(s) after they were infected by mali-
cious software. In recent years, botnets have shown to be the
basic platform for the execution of a wide variety of attacks
such as Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS), spamming,
phishing and identity theft that in several cases were targeting
critical socioeconomic infrastructures, governmental services
or commercial organizations [1], [2], [3]. Hence, nowadays
botnets are for the most part related to the growth of cyber
crimes as well as cyber warfare and their behaviour has at-
tracted a considerable interest by the research community [1],
[2], [3], [5]. In parallel, their immediate detection is seen as a
challenging task for network security experts within industrial
organisations [1], [2].
Throughout the years, the capabilities disclosed within the
functionality of botnets have significantly increased leading to
the point where traditional categories of malicious software
(i.e. malware) may not be easily identified. As mentioned
in [1], there is a plethora of reports of a large number of
botnets composed by thousands of systems where the total
estimated number of compromised machines used by botnets
today is in millions. In contrast with the past, the motivation
behind the malicious activity of botnets has significantly
changed due to the diversification and ubiquitous properties
of the Internet that acts as the hub to several socioeconomical
infrastructures. Hence, attackers do not primarily seek recog-
nition from the hackers community as in the early stages of
the Internet but rather prefer to obtain financial gain or even
infiltrate and destroy governmental services [1], [3].
A core procedure within the construction of botnets as well
as their expansion by further malware and virus propagation
relates with the efficiency of the scan procedure invoked by
the botmaster via its Command & Control (C&C) server.
The scanning process employed by a botnet is a large scaled
coordinated event and usually involves a large number of
bots [2]. Mainly, the objective of this process is to provide
knowledge to the botmaster regarding vulnerable hosts and
services running over particular network domains. Thus, the
majority of botmasters construct sophisticated scan procedures
in order to avoid common port scanning detection schemes
which are currently employed by ISPs( e.g. with tools like
NMAP 1), to detect a high number of vulnerable hosts and
speed up the expansion of their botnet. As evidently shown
in many cases [4], the scanning procedure is considered as
a fundamental element within a botnet and its explicit char-
acterisation would beneficially aid the operations of security
components within an organisation in proactively identifying
the spread or early establishment of a botnet.
The contribution of our work resides within the statistical
characterisation and profiling of scanning activity as triggered
by botnets. In particular we provide an insight regarding the
intrinsic properties of scan traffic manifested by the well
known Mariposa [5] and Zeus botnets [7] and we profile
them under the conditional entropy metric using real backbone
and access network packet traces. In contrast with previous
studies on both botnets [5], [6], [7] that have been mainly
concerned with the system-wise properties and effects of the
malware forged by this botnet we elaborate in detail on their
scanning procedure. Through our analysis we show that their
initiated scan process is between them similar and differs
significantly from other scan activities. In order to demonstrate
this property we have compared their flow scan characteristics
with commonly practised scan processes initiated by the well
known NMAP tool. Hence, we have gathered and analyzed
packet traces of the NMAP Connect and NMAP Stealth scans
1Nmap : http://nmap.org/
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Fig. 1: A conceptual view of the structure for both Mariposa
and the Zeus botnet in the examined datasets.
and further indicate their explicit differences with Mariposa
and Zeus-related scans. Overall, we argue, that the study
documented here may sufficiently contribute to the future
studies of botnets and can significantly contribute towards the
manifestation of early botnet detection schemes.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Sec-
tion II provides a brief description of the Mariposa and Zeus
botnets as well as the NMAP Stealth and Connect types of
scans. Subsequently, Section III introduces the datasets and
the methodology employed in this work whereas Section IV
demonstrates and discusses the results obtained in our evalua-
tion. Finally, Section V concludes and summarises this paper.
II. BOTNETS & SCANS
A. The Mariposa Botnet
The Mariposa botnet was first discovered by security experts
in December 2008 and its malicious operations were mainly
dependent on the exploitations of the "Butterfly bot" malware
developed by the DDP Spanish hacking group [5]. As docu-
mented in the technical report provided in [5], this particular
botnet was in a position to compromise more than 10 million
machines worldwide and fork several Denial of Service (DoS)
attacks as well as numerous bulk e-mail spamming. The expan-
sion of this botnet was stopped in late 2009 by the immediate
acts performed by the Mariposa Working Group [5]. However,
as we indicate in this work, the Mariposa malware still exists
since our initial investigation through a de facto IDS such as
Snort 2 identified several flows that carried the bot’s signature.
As illustrated in Fig. 1, the activities of any botnet (includ-
ing Mariposa and Zeus that we describe next) are initiated
by several command and control (i.e. C&C) servers which are
controlled by a botmaster(s). Its capabilities may be considered
as threatening since the botmaster may infinitely extend the
functionality of the malicious software beyond the initial
2Snort IDS: http://www.snort.org/
compromise [5] due to the fact that the botnet has the ability to
download and execute arbitrary executable programs. As also
identified in this paper, the majority of the C&C servers receive
and transmit instructions and data through encrypted UDP
datagrams. The instructions given to the C&C or from the CC
to the compromised machines include download instructions
for a malware update, introduction of new control domain
names as well as the renaming of ASCII commands. Under
a centralised C&C server scheme 3, a botmaster requires to
obtain knowledge regarding a plethora of DNS servers and
further identify vulnerabilities that would aid the establishment
of new C&C servers that will eventually spread malicious
software to new compromised machines. Naturally, the knowl-
edge regarding vulnerable DNS domains is obtained by simply
scanning nearby networks through the already settled C&C
servers. Hence, the botmaster sends several scan requests to
its compromised C&C servers that would subsequently convey
these requests to the bots under their control. The detailed
analyses provided in [5], [6] indicate that the majority of the
Mariposa C&C servers communicate via UDP datagrams and
particularly via customized commands of the traceroute UNIX
utility 4 that perform DNS lookups. Hence the greatest number
of scan traffic would be embodied within the UDP data traffic.
As we describe in section IV our investigation came to the
same conclusion but with the difference that a small portion
of scan traffic was also classified under ICMP and not UDP
since the traceroute program can also be initiated under ICMP.
B. The Zeus Botnet
The Zeus botnet is known by many names (e.g. ZBOT,
WSNPoem, PRG) and it was firstly tracked by the US Federal
Bureau of Investigation (FBI) in 2010 where the botnet was
observed to infect more than 3.6 millions of machines world-
wide [7]. Despite the fact that it was identified in 2010, recent
investigations from the FBI have witnessed new variants [8]
of the botnet that infected more than 10 millions of machines
that participated in financial cybercrimes such as bank fraud
and money laundering transactions. The reason behind the
rise-up of several Zeus variants relates with the ease of their
deployments by the widely known and freely available Zeus
crimeware toolkit [7] where users of such software may easily
"craft" a botnet with varying characteristics.
One of the core modifications behind each new Zeus version
is the change of the communication protocol between the
"zombie" bots with the C&C server(s) that is controlled by
the botmaster. Hence, there has been a number of Zeus botnets
that employed a decentralised C&C server(s) communication
scheme. Moreover, the main operations with respect to the
propagation and establishment of the Zeus malware through
the networked bots are changed based on modifications on the
packet payload signatures.
3Despite the fact that both Mariposa and Zeus botnets may appear under a
P2P-based and decentralised C&C architecture, the examined datasets in this
piece of work have revealed a centralised C&C architecture.
4Traceroute : http://www.traceroute.org/
TABLE I: Captured Operational Traces
Set Source Year Link Type Packets Bytes Scan-related flows
SamplePoint-F WIDE Mawai [10] 2012 Backbone 30.3G 65G 2.4M
Zeus SNORT VRT Labs[11] 2014 Access 8.21K 6.2M 1.2K
UCSD Telescope CAIDA [12] 2008 Access 16.3M 1.6G 218K
Nonetheless, in the majority of cases where a Zeus botnet
was identified and analysed it was revealed that under a
centralised C&C communication scheme this particular botnet
relies heavily on the HTTP protocol. In particular, the botnet
utilises a pull method for synchronising the C&C commu-
nication scheme and all the exchanged HTTP messages are
encrypted. Moreover, every Zeus malware instance that already
exists in a compromised machine initiates DNS lookups as
well as block port scanning procedures which are mainly
triggered by customised processes designed by the botmaster.
Block scanning combines both vertical and horizontal scan-
ning where an attacker scans several destination ports on a
given host (i.e. vertical) but also multiple hosts on the same
destination port number (i.e. horizontal).However, as we show
in this paper and discuss in Section IV the examined Zeus
sample indicated a strong horizontal port scan procedure.
C. NMAP Scans
This work aims to compare the port scan traffic of the two
aforementioned botnets with standardised port scan practises
that have been excessively employed by network operators as
well as attackers. Therefore, we have chosen to investigate and
compare the behaviours of two types of port scans which are
easily achieved with the use of the NMAP tool. The NMAP
tool provides the capabilities to manifest a range of port and
address space scans but the mostly known types are considered
to be the Connect and Stealth scans which we have extracted
from a real pre-captured packet trace as we explain in the next
section.
The NMAP Connect Scan is also known as the TCP SYN
connect() scan and is considered as the most typical form of
scan performed when using the NMAP facility. This particular
approach utilizes the local Operating System’s (OS) connect()
function in order to initiate a TCP connection to a remote
device by starting with a TCP SYN packet with an IP Don’t
Fragment flag set to 1. As soon as it completes the 3-way TCP
handshake on a given port it tears down the connection with
a RST/ACK packet.
On the other hand, the NMAP Stealth Scan behaves as a
half-open TCP SYN scan since in contrast with the Connect
Scan it does not complete the 3-way TCP handshake. Similarly
with the Connect Scan it utilizes the connect() OS function
and initially sends a TCP SYN packet but with a different
flag on the IP Don’t Fragment option (i.e. set to 0) in order
to receive a SYN/ACK packet response from the remote port.
Subsequently, a RST/ACK packet is sent in order to terminate
the incomplete TCP handshake procedure. In comparison with
the Connect Scan, the Stealth Scan is naturally completed
faster and information regarding open ports is derived quicker.
III. DATA DESCRIPTION & METHODOLOGY
A. Data Description & Pre-processing
As Table I shows, this work has examined three differ-
ent datasets. The Samplepoint-F is the dataset where the
Mariposa botnet was detected and consists of anonymised
packet traces captured on a 150Mbps US-Japan TransPacific
backbone link and captured by the WIDE Mawi working
group in March 2012 [10]. The Zeus dataset is composed
of three merged packet traces which were filtered out of a
larger packet trace by the researchers in the VRT labs [11]
that was captured on an access network in 2014. Finally the
third sample we use from the USCD Telescope dataset was
captured by CAIDA [12] between December 2008 and January
2009 within an experimental globally routed /8 network that
filters out legitimate traffic and keeps anomalous unidirectional
IP flows which are caused by a number of events such as
router misconfigurations, address space and port scanning
and DDoS attacks5. Overall, this dataset is in a position to
provide a snapshot of the anomalous background occurring
on the 1/256th of all public IPv4 destination addresses on the
Internet. However, for the purpose of this work and in order
to extract some representative NMAP scan samples we only
used a small subset of this dataset.
Apart from the already provided Zeus-related flows, this
work first had to isolate scan traffic flows for the Mariposa
and NMAP scans. Thus, an initial step was to employ deep
packet inspection (DPI) on the captured packets traces and
detect any Mariposa-related payload signatures using the Snort
IDS on the Samplepoint-F traffic trace. The NMAP Stealth and
Connect scans were easily extracted from the UCSD Telescope
dataset using custom Wireshark 6 filters.
The scan flows for all 4 scan processes of the Mariposa,
Zeus, NMAP Connect and NMAP Stealth were statistically
characterised under the conditional metric derived by the
distribution of 17 selected flow features for each flow. The
17 "raw" per flow statistical features that form the basis of
our work are the following:
• Src port
• Dst port
• Count of packets
• Count of bytes
• Flow duration
• Mean packet size
• Mean packet inter-arrival time
• Sizes of the first 10 packets for each unidirectional flow
Given the above pre-processing step, we subsequently con-
structed the per-flow feature vectors and then computed the
5For the purpose of this paper we have particularly assessed the NMAP
Stealth and NMAP Connect scans captured on December 2008 [12].
6Wireshark Traffic Analyzer: https://www.wireshark.org/
conditional entropy between them as we describe next.
B. Theoretical Methodology
The foundational element within our methodology lies with
the computation of conditional entropy between the afore-
mentioned feature vectors for each consecutive unidirectional
scan flow. Essentially, the outcome of this computation is
to measure the amount of information for a scan flow X
with features [x1, x2, · · · , xn] and a probability distribution
PX(x) by knowing the occurrence of a scan flow Y with
features [y1, y2, · · · , ym] and a probability distribution PY (y).
In simple words, the conditional entropy metric provides the
level of dependence between two random and independent
flows and can pinpoint on whether several transmissions within
the network are linearly dependent on each other with respect
to the information they carry.
The conditional probability of x given y, PX|Y (x|y), aids
to construct the conditional entropy H(X|Y ) which is defined
by:
H(X|Y ) =
∑
y
PY (y)−
∑
x
PX|Y (x|y)log(PX|Y (x|y)) (1)
As we following describe, the resulted conditional entropy
vectors were compared using the two sample Kolmogorov-
Smirnov (KS) test in order to measure the level of simi-
larity between the botnet-based and the NMAP-based scan
processes.
C. Two Sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) Test
In order to validate our hypothesis on whether the condi-
tional entropy derived for all the scan flows of the Mariposa,
Zeus and NMAP scans would exhibit a level of similarity we
have employed the Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) test that we
following describe.
Let Tm = t1, . . . , tm, Tz = t1, . . . , tn, Tnc = t1, . . . , tc and
Tns = t1, . . . , ts represent the resulting conditional entropy
vectors gathered for each transport layer network flow where
Tm, Tz , Tnc and Tns denote the vectors for the Mariposa,
Zeus, NMAP Connect and NMAP Stealth scan respectively.
However, for the sake of clarity we elaborate on the two
sample KS test by taking as examples the Tm and Tz vectors.
The vector Tm of size m has the cumulative distribution
function (i.e. c.d.f) F (x) and Tz of size n a c.d.f with
G(x) and their corresponding empirical c.d.fs as Fm(x) and
Gn(x) respectively. Under these terms, the KS test holds two
hypotheses, the null hypothesis H0 : F = G and the rejection
of the null hypothesis H1 : F 6= G. In order to validate the
null hypothesis via measuring the statistical (in)significance
between Fm(x) and Gn(x) it is required to compute the
Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistic Dmn defined as:
Dmn =
(
mn
m+ n
)1/2
sup
n
|Fm(x)−Gn(x)| (2)
The null hypothesis is rejected in the statistical significance
level a if √
mn
m+ n
Dmn > Kα (3)
where Kα of statistical significance level α can be found from
the relationship of the Kolmogorov distribution K denoted as:
K = sup
t∈[0,1]
|B(t)| (4)
and has the following relationship 7
Pr (K ≤ Kα) = 1− α (5)
The statistical significance level α is the most critical param-
eter that actually determines the sensitivity at which the KS
test will reject the null hypothesis or otherwise. Thus, after
experimentation we kept it to hold the value of 0.05 since
while tuning this parameter with higher values there was a
biased result in favor of the null hypothesis.
In order to thoroughly determine and exhibit the resulting
outcomes of our hypothesis validation we have computed the
resulting p-value. In practise, the p-value denotes the proba-
bility on whether the KS test statistic derived by equation 2
and examined in equation 3 is extreme or more extreme than
the observed value under the null hypothesis. As we show in
section IV-B if the resulted p-value is much lower than the
significance level a then we reject the null hypothesis and the
opposite if greater.
IV. RESULTS
A. Analysis of Volume-based Features
The evaluation conducted on the network traces had first
to comprehend the network-wise properties of the scan flows
triggered by the CC servers of Mariposa and Zeus as well
as the NMAP-related scans. Therefore, we visualised and
manually inspected the volume-wise activity with respect to
their destination and source IP ports.
Figures 2, 3, 4 and 5 provide the behaviour of bytes and
packets with respect to the source and destination (src/dst)
IP ports per each unidirectional scan flow. Overall, it is
clearly evidenced that both botnets exhibit a much higher level
of consistency in their scan activities since there are clear
patterns with respect to the outgoing and incoming volume-
wise distribution (i.e. counts of bytes and packets) of their
associated scan flows on specific IP src/dst ports. On the other
hand the flows triggered by the two NMAP scans behave in a
random fashion for an extremely large range of IP src/dst ports.
However, the explicit case of the Mariposa botnet indicates a
block scan property where both horizontal and vertical scans
are visible.
Mariposa Scan: A closer look in our datasets revealed
that the scan activities of the Mariposa C&C server were not
restricted at only using UDP datagrams as reported in [5]
but also to the transmission of ICMP packets. In particular,
the compromised C&C server used the scanning capabilities
of the traceroute utility and was arbitrarily aiming to detect
vulnerable ports on several domains. The manual inspection
on the actual packet traces revealed some instances where
7B(t) in equation 4 denotes the Brownian bridge of a continuous stochastic
process.
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Fig. 2: Packet activity for all types of scans with respect to IP
destination ports.
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Fig. 3: Byte activity for all types of scans with respect to IP
destination ports.
the traceroute utility was transmitting a sequence of three
ICMP echo request packets on a given destination host with
increasing Time-To-Live (TTL) values. Moreover, the C&C
server performed scans to open hosts on a range of DNS
domains under the traceroute utility by the transmission of
UDP datagrams. From both a packet and byte-wise perspective
on Figures 2 and 3, it is fairly obvious to pinpoint that the scan
activity is being due to the vertical shape of the packets and
bytes on the UDP port 33434 which is a standard traceroute
port. Several flows triggered by the C&C server were not
only initiated for scanning purposes but also contained reply
data from the traceroute service from each remote host that
naturally important network topology information was present
regarding the next hop of their adjacent network. These flows
are easily identifiable in both figures due to the high byte and
packet-wise consumption they exposed. Finally, low volume
flows (i.e. low packet and byte counts per flow) reside on the
horizontal shape(s) in both Fig. 2 and Fig. 3 for the Mariposa-
related plots and they mainly relate with the aforementioned
random DNS lookups.
The above findings are also verified while observing the
volume distribution with respect to the initiated source ports in
all the Mariposa-related scan flows. As demonstrated explicitly
for the Mariposa plots via Fig. 4 and Fig. 5, there is a crisp
visualisation of the volume-based behaviour in regards of
the sender source ports under two vertical shapes. The most
volume-wise intensive vertical shape denotes all the flows
related with any traceroute activity on the UDP destination
port 33434 which were initiated within the range 52995-53586
of UDP source ports. We argue that these ports were used
since they are unregistered by IANA as well as arbitrary, thus
any signature-based IDS or scan detector would not be in a
position to flag them easily8. Apart from these highly visible
source ports, the second most frequent source port is the UDP
8Around 60% of these flows were not detected initially by Snort since most
of the pre-defined Zeus-related rules were only observing the packet payload.
Thus we had to refine Snort-specific rulesets alongside customized tcpdump
filters in order to extract them.
port 53 which justifies the fact of random and low-volume
DNS lookups and surely complies with the horizontal shapes
of the Mariposa plots in Figures. 2 and 3. The majority of the
DNS lookup flows were single-packet flows with an average
of 135 bytes.
Zeus Scan: The Zeus botnet scan activity exhibited a far
more distinguishable persona than the one initiated by the
Mariposa botnet. From both packet and byte-wise distributions
on the targeted IP destination ports, it is evidenced that there
was the initiation of a typical horizontal scan procedure. This
behaviour is justified by the visualisations in Figures 2 and 3
where an immense amount of bytes and packets are destined
towards the TCP ports 1032,1033 and 1035 as well as the TCP
port 80 (i.e. vertical shapes). Hence, the scanning activities of
Zeus were mainly dedicated on the HTTP protocol and the
objective was to scan for vulnerable web servers on these
particular ports on a number of different hosts on several
domains. At the same time, the requests sent to the TCP
destination ports 1032,1033 and 1035 are mapped as the actual
probing, scanning and further deployment of the Zeus trojan
on remote hosts. In particular, Windows-based machines are
prone on this particular ports due to the insecure initiation
of the Message Application Programming Interface (MAPI)
protocol on the Outlook e-mail clients. Hence, this finding
verifies the fact that Zeus-related Trojans as initiated by their
botmaster hold the objective to infiltrate mail applications
in order to enforce their propagation through spamming and
further establish strong foundations towards phishing attacks.
Nevertheless, apart from pure informational scanning it is
also noticeable via Fig. 2 and Fig. 3 the intention of the scan
flows from the Zeus C&C server to flood these particular ports
with unidirectional flows that contain large numbers of packets
and extremely large byte sizes that go beyond the Maximum
Transmission Unit (MTU) threshold of 1500 bytes per packet.
Such behaviours are also depicted and justified in the Zeus-
related plots provided in Figures 4 and 5. In particular, the
revealed vertical shapes demonstrate that the mostly active
TCP source port was the the HTTP port 80 as well as those
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Fig. 4: Packet activity for all types of scans with respect to IP
source ports.
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Fig. 5: Byte activity for all types of scans with respect to IP
source ports.
wthin the range of 1051−1099. The greatest majority of byte-
wise (with a lesser number of packets) intensive scan flows
were sourced by TCP port 80 and they were probing multiple
hosts on the same destination port for open web servers. On the
other hand the scanning and flooding flows destined randomly
to the TCP ports 1032,1033 and 1035 were sent from TCP
source ports ranging between 1051− 1099. Each of this flow
was characterised under large numbers of packets but each
holding an extremely low byte size.
NMAP Scans: As anticipated by our initial hypothesis,
both NMAP scans have shown an utter random behaviour
where a vast range of TCP src/dst ports was used in order
to perform the extracted portscans. Hence, the generated plots
that represent the packet and byte-wise behaviour for both the
NMAP Connect and NMAP Stealth indicate that their scan
process is not volume-wise intensive and their characteristics
comply with their description provided earlier (Section II-C).
In contrast with the volume-wise scan profiles of the Zeus
and Mariposa botnets, the NMAP-based port scans cannot be
classified either as horizontal nor vertical since random TCP
destination ports were requested on random hosts.
In particular and as exhibited by Figures 2, 3, 4 and 5, all
the unidirectional flows related with the NMAP Connect scan
had a maximum number of 7 packets with a maximum size
of 430 bytes. The randomness behind all the scans are easily
distinguishable by the shape of all the plots related with this
particular scan where all possible TCP src/dst ports within the
range of 0− 9999 were used.
Under a similar fashion, the NMAP Stealth scan exhibited
a random scan behaviour where all the possible combinations
of TCP src/dst port pairs were used. The flows related with
this scan process have demonstrated similar volume utilization
with those of the NMAP Connect scan but with some minor
cases of higher packet and byte count. As visually depicted
by Figures 2, 3, 4 and 5 the largest number of unidirectional
flows had less than 5 packets with an average size of 350 bytes.
However, there were around 30 flows that exhibited a greater
number of packets within the range of 7 − 23 packets with
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Fig. 6: Empirical CDFs of the resulting conditional entropy
vectors for each scan process.
higher byte utilization between 400 and 1100. Nonetheless,
none of these flows appeared with a packet that reaches or
overpasses the MTU threshold as it happenned with the botnet-
related scan packets discussed earlier.
B. Scan Traffic Comparison
By following the methodology presented in Section III we
were able to compute the conditional entropy vectors after
treating each scan flow as a vector composed by the 17
flow-features presented earlier in Section III-B. A subsequent
step was to compute the empirical cummulative distribution
function (CDF) for the newly composed conditional entropy
vectors and finally compare them with the two sample KS test
that we have also described earlier (Section III-C).
Fig. 6 illustrates the resulting empirical CDFs of the con-
ditional entropy vectors associated for each type of scan.
Undoubtedly , it is evident that the CDFs corresponding to
NMAP-based scans differ significantly from the CDFs that
represent the conditional entropy between the scan flows
triggerred by the Zeus and Mariposa botnet. In parallel, the
TABLE II: The asymptotic p-values between the various types
of scans under the two-sample KS test. H(0) denotes the null
hypothesis of similarity between the examined distributions
where the significance level α = 0.05.
Scan Comparison p-value H(0)
Zeus vs. Mariposa 0.2033 > α accepted
Zeus vs. NMAP Stealth 3.5405e-13 < α rejected
Zeus vs. NMAP Connect 3.6905e-12 < α rejected
Mariposa vs. NMAP Stealth 8.9434e-21 < α rejected
Mariposa vs. NMAP Connect 9.9434e-19 < α rejected
NMAP Stealth vs. NMAP Connect 6.8722e-61 <α rejected
generated CDFs for the two botnets have a visual similarity
and they establish a leverage towards the acceptance of the
null hypothesis in the KS test. Hence it can be hypothetized
that their scan characteristics could comply with the same
distribution. This hypothesis is validated under the KS-test
where all the resulting p-values are computed as depicted in
Table II.The computed p-values surely justify our hypothesis
on whether the scan flows produced by the two botnets hold
a significant statistical similarity between them with respect
to the conditional entropy. At the same time the comparison
of both botnet conditional entropy vectors with the NMAP-
related scan traffic conditional entropy vectors have appeared
to reject the null hypothesis since the resulted p-values where
extremely lower than the significance level α. Similarly, the
comparison between the two different scans composed by the
same tool have also indicated a completely different persona
with respect to their resulting conditional entropy, thus the
generated p-value led to reject the null hypothesis. Thus,
they do not have common characteristics from a statistical
viewpoint with respect to their flow-based feature distributions.
Overall, this simple comparison between the 4 different scan
traffic profiles is leading to the conclusion that coordinated and
carefully-designed botnets manifest intrinsic scan properties
which are not easily identifiable and separable by typical port
scans initiated by widely-used tools such as NMAP. Thus, their
identification and further grouping would have to be expressed
in terms of meaningful statistical features.
V. CONCLUSIONS
This paper provides a thorough analysis and insight regard-
ing the scan processes initiated by the Mariposa and Zeus
botnets as identified on real backbone and access network
traces since both botnets have been excessively reported as
two of the most dangerous botnets in the wild with millions
of machines compromised. Hence, we initially examine their
scan procedures with respect to their volume-based charac-
teristics and we further compare them under their resulting
conditional entropy metric with two commonly practised by
attackers NMAP-based scans (i.e. NMAP Connect and NMAP
Stealth scans) that we have extracted from real pre-captured
operational network data.
The detailed volume-based analysis revealed that the Mari-
posa botnet’s C&C server employed a block types of port
scans where both horizontal and vertical types of scans are
accommodated using the UDP and ICMP protocol. In parallel,
the Zeus botnet demonstrates a distinctive horizontal port scan
scan where scan-related flows are initiated on the same TCP
destination port on multiple hosts for different domains. On
the other hand, scan flows initiated by NMAP Stealth and
NMAP Connect scans appeared to operate arbitrarily using
random src/dst TCP ports. However, despite the volume-
wise differences between the scanning procedures between the
Mariposa and the Zeus botnets our comparison under the con-
ditional entropy metric as composed by 17 per-flow features
demonstrated that both scanning processes hold an extremely
significant statistical similarity. In parallel, both botnet scan
processes do not hold any similar characteristics with any of
the two examined NMAP-based scan processes. Hence, we
have shown that carefully crafted botnets do aim to go beyond
standardised scan procedures as implemented by commonly
used tools such as NMAP. In parallel, we demonstrate that
regardless of the differing botnet volume-wise scan behaviour,
a characterisation under conditional entropy may adequately
profile them. Therefore, the outcomes of this work demonstrate
the capability of our proposed scheme for profiling differing
botnet scan traffic. We have provided a simple botnet scan
traffic profiling methodology under the conditional entropy
metric that goes beyond rule-based schemes and can suffi-
ciently aid network security experts while composing network
diagnostics. Overall we argue that the study and method
reported herein can significantly contribute and constitute as
a vital component within the design of holistic early botnet
detection tools.
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